SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CRIMINAL LAW-MERGER AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY-RESENTENCING PERMISSIBLE WHERE SUBSTANTIVE

SENTENCE DISTURBED ON APPEAL-

BASIS FOR ORIGINAL

State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J.

263, 478 A.2d 408 (1984).

On November 1, 1980, Angel Rodriguez entered Maria
Cruz's apartment and sexually assaulted her mentally retarded
daughter, Evelyn. When Cruz attempted to stop him, Rodriguez
punched her, followed her into the kitchen, and shot her. He
then removed a sum of money from her brassiere. Cruz later
died as a result of her injuries.
Rodriguez was convicted by a jury of felony murder, robbery, criminal sexual contact, aggravated assault, and unlawful
possession of a handgun. 97 N.J. at 266, 478 A.2d at 409-10. He
received a twenty year sentence with a minimum of ten years parole ineligibility for the murder and a consecutive term of ten
years with five years parole ineligibility for the underlying robbery. Id. at 266-67, 478 A.2d at 410. He also received an eighteen month term for criminal sexual contact, eighteen months for
aggravated assault, and three years for the unlawful possession of
a handgun. Each of these sentences was to run concurrently with
his ten year sentence for felony murder. Id. at 266, 478 A.2d at
410. His aggregate sentence, therefore, totalled thirty years with
a minimum of fiteen years parole ineligibility. Id. at 265-66, 478
A.2d at 409.
On appeal, Rodriguez claimed that the trial court should
have merged the robbery and felony murder charges and that the
aggregate sentence imposed was excessive. He also attacked the
underlying convictions, claiming that the trial court had committed reversible error by allowing Evelyn's sister to act as interpreter. The appellate division found that there was ample
justification for the appointment of Evelyn's sister as interpreter.
Although the court also found that the aggregate sentence was
not excessive, it did hold that the robbery conviction merged
with the felony murder conviction and, accordingly, it vacated the
sentence imposed for robbery. The appellate court also denied
the state's request that Rodriguez be resentenced for felony murder. The supreme court granted certification to determine
whether "the trial court [had] the power to resentence the defendant in excess of the criminal sentence for felony murder
upon the merger of the robbery conviction into the felony murder conviction." Id. at 267, 478 A.2d at 410.
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The supreme court, in reversing, held that Rodriguez could
be resentenced to a term that did not exceed the aggregate
length of the sentences originally imposed for the robbery and
felony murder convictions. Id. at 277, 478 A.2d at 415. The
court observed that the doublejeopardy considerations that militate against increasing a defendant's sentence after he has served
a portion of his term did not apply. Such considerations, the
court reasoned, were founded upon the finality of a sentence
based on a conviction that has not been challenged on appeal.
Id. at 268-69, 478 A.2d at 411. The court concluded that because
Rodriguez had attacked the convictions underlying his sentences,
he had no legitimate expectation of finality in those sentences.
Thus, in the court's view, modification of the underlying convictions was a sufficient ground for resentencing. Id. at 271, 478
A.2d at 412.
The court stressed that the sentences originally imposed
were interrelated and were based on interdependent convictions.
Id. at 275-76, 478 A.2d at 410. It was evident to the court that
the trial court had structured its sentences so that Rodriguez
would serve a term of thirty years as a result of the robbery and
murder convictions. Id. at 274, 478 A.2d at 414. The court
found the sentence to be justified by the depraved and heinous
nature of the crime. Id. at 274 n.3, 478 A.2d at 414 n.3. The
court also found that, given the merger of the offenses, the robbery should be considered as an additional aggravating circumstance in determining Rodriguez's punishment for felony
murder. Id. at 275, 478 A.2d at 414-15. Because his successful
appeal of the robbery conviction had disturbed the substantive
basis for the sentence imposed for the murder charge, the court
determined that it was within the discretion of the appellate court
to vacate both sentences and order resentencing on the murder
conviction. Id. at 275-76, 478 A.2d at 415.
The new NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1978 N.J.
Laws, ch. 95, is based upon the Legislature's determination that
the most effective way to deter violent crime is to provide sure
and certain forms of punishment. See State v. Roth, 95 NJ. 334,
358, 471 A.2d 379, 391 (1984). The Rodriguez decision is consistent with the stringent punishment provisions of the Code. It is
possible, however, that there may be at least one negative consequence of this decision. Criminal defendants faced with multiple
convictions may be reluctant to pursue meritorious appeals if
they do not believe that the successful prosecution of those ap-
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peals will result in a reduction of their sentences. Reducing the
number of such appeals could result in the perpetuation of criminal trial error and a corresponding decline in the quality of
prosecutorial trial preparation. Prosecutors could rely on an airtight conviction on one count to shield convictions on additional
counts from appellate review and would no longer need to prepare diligently every facet of a criminal case. The courts must
make every effort to prevent this result and to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.
Lawrence M. Czaplewski

ACCOUNTANTS-COURT-APPOINTED
NEGLIGENT

EVALUATION

OF

ACCOUNTANTS LIABLE FOR

EQUITABLE

DISTRIBUTION

As-

SETS-Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97 N.J. 242, 478 A.2d 397 (1984).

After filing for divorce from her husband Bernard, Grace Levine requested that the court appoint an impartial expert to evaluate her husband's interest in a close corporation. The Levines
then agreed to the entry of a consent order that provided that the
findings of the expert would be binding upon them for purposes
of equitable distribution. They selected the accounting firm of
Wiss & Company (Wiss), which submitted a report to the court
estimating the value of the Levines' interest in the corporation.
97 N.J. at 244-45, 478 A.2d at 398.
Prior to trial, the Levines reached a property settlement
based on the Wiss report. Subsequently, however, both parties
moved to vacate the settlement. The trial court denied the motion and in April 1979, entered a judgment of divorce that incorporated the property settlement agreement. On Mr. Levine's
appeal, the appellate division affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Id. at 245, 478 A.2d at 398.
In 1982, Bernard Levine brought suit against Wiss, alleging
that the firm had provided incorrect values that bound him to an
unfavorable property settlement. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and determined that court-appointed accountants may
only be sued for acts of bad faith. The appellate division reversed. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate division's decision. Id. at 246, 478 A.2d at 399. It held that the de-
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retained by the

parties to perform a specific duty." Id. at 252, 478 A.2d at 402.
Thus, they were required by the terms of their agreement "to
exercise the skill and knowledge possessed by members of [their]
profession." Id. at 246, 478 A.2d at 399. In rejecting the defendants' claims that they should be immune from suit because they
had been appointed pursuant to a court order, the court distinguished between the roles of "appraisers" and "arbitrators" in
dispute resolution. Id. at 248-52, 478 A.2d at 400-02. Although
arbitrators generally are immune from private claims brought by
parties to a dispute, id. at 250, 478 A.2d at 401, appraisers, the
court noted, can be held liable for their failure to exercise reasonable care and competence in performing their services. Id. at
248, 478 A.2d at 400. The court reasoned that an "appraiser" is
introduced into a dispute to apply some special skill, knowledge,
or expertise in the ascertainment of particular facts. Id. An "arbitrator," on the other hand, usually functions in an adjudicatory
manner and actually proceeds to a final resolution of the dispute
between the parties. Id. at 249-50, 478 A.2d at 401. Because
Wiss made a single finding of fact and did not resolve the legal
rights and obligations of the parties, the court concluded that it
was not entitled to the limited immunity that is generally accorded arbitrators. Id. at 252-53, 478 A.2d at 402.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Hern, joined by ChiefJustice Wilentz and Justice Garibaldi, asserted that arbitration exists
whenever the parties voluntarily refer their dispute to another
and agree to be bound by the decision. Id. at 256-57, 478 A.2d at
404-05 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). He opined that arbitral immunity should not be limited to structured formats, id. at 258, 478
A.2d at 405 (O'Hern, J., dissenting), and that limited liability
should be extended to those involved in other methods of dispute resolution, such as non-binding arbitration and mediation.
Id. at 261-62, 478 A.2d at 407 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). In the
dissent's view, the majority's opinion failed to recognize and further the development of alternatives to litigation in dispute resolution. Id. at 256, 478 A.2d at 404 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
Two competing public policies are brought into sharp focus
by the majority and dissenting opinions in Levine. The dissent
stressed the need to develop alternative methods of dispute resolution that will " 'dispense justice quickly and efficiently while
easing the ever-increasing burden on limited court resources.'
Id. at 254, 478 A.2d at 403 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (quoting
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Supreme Court Committee on Complementary Dispute Resolution Programs (Burlington County Project), Final Report 1
(March 23, 1984)). The majority, however, effectuated what it
considered to be the "prevailing philosophy and practice that
strive to provide redress for wrongful injury." Id. at 251, 478
A.2d at 401-02. Although the majority opinion may lessen some
professionals' willingness to participate in the new programs, it is
questionable whether the participation of experts who do not apply the ordinary skills possessed by the members of their profession should be encouraged. The ultimate success of programs
employing alternative methods of dispute resolution depends as
much on the quality of the justice dispensed as it does on the
speed and efficiency with which it is dispensed. In recognizing a
cause of action predicated upon proof of professional malpractice, the court has taken a significant step toward ensuring that
those who submit themselves to alternate forms of dispute resolution are not subjected to second-rate treatment.
James R. Icklan

DAMAGES-FRAUD-NoMINAL

AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE

ASSESSED FOR LEGAL FRAUD DESPITE ABSENCE OF COMPENSA-

DAMAGES-Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello,
97 N.J. 37, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984).
TORY

In May 1973, Moritz Nappe tentatively agreed to loan
Avenel Boulevard, Inc. (Avenel) $200,000 to finance the building
and furnishing of a model condominium for a high rise apartment complex, which Avenel was constructing in Monmouth
Beach. Nappe was told by Richard Bonello, Avenel's attorney,
that he would receive ten percent of the project's profits in exchange for the loan. 97 N.J. at 43, 477 A.2d at 1227. One month
later, the parties signed a written agreement, which did not expressly restrict Avenel's use of Nappe's money. Although the
funds were advanced, none of the loan money was used to build
and furnish the model apartment. Instead, the loan proceeds
were diverted and the project subsequently was abandoned for
lack of funds. After learning of the diversion, Nappe brought an
action against Bonello for legal fraud. Id. at 43-44, 477 A.2d at
1227-28.
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At trial, the jury found that Bonello had committed an actionable fraud with respect to the condominium loan. Id. at 45,
477 A.2d at 1228. Nappe, however, failed to show any loss of
profits due to the diversion of the loan proceeds. Id. at 43-44,
477 A.2d at 1227-28. Because actual damages were not computable, the jury awarded Nappe one dollar in nominal damages. In
addition, a single punitive damage award of $50,000 was assessed
for the frauds connected with the loan transaction and a separate
real estate transaction. Id. at 45, 477 A.2d at 1228. On Bonello's
appeal, the appellate division reversed. It held that compensatory damages were necessary in order to establish a cause of action for legal fraud, that nominal damages could not be awarded,
and that punitive damages could not be recovered unless compensatory damages were proven. Nappe's claim concerning the
loan was remanded for a new trial on the issues of liability and
compensatory damages for loss of interest on the loaned money.
The appellate court explained that compensatory damages could
be awarded for Nappe's loss of interest if the jury found that the
loan had been fraudulently induced. Id. at 42, 477 A.2d at 122627. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether compensable damages had to be proven in an
action for legal fraud and, if not, whether nominal and punitive
damages could nevertheless be recovered. Id. at 43, 477 A.2d at
1227.
The supreme court reversed in part and affirmed in part. Id.
at 54, 477 A.2d at 1233. It held that proof of compensatory damages is not a requisite element of legal fraud and that nominal
damages may be awarded where no compensatory damages are
proven. Id. at 48, 477 A.2d at 1229-30. The court also held that,
in actions involving intentional torts and egregious conduct, punitive damages may be recovered "whether or not compensatory
damages are awarded, at least where some injury, loss, or detriment to the plaintiff has occurred." Id. at 51, 477 A.2d at 1232.
Because the propriety of the appellate division's decision to remand the case to evaluate damages for lost interest was not
presented to the court, it did not disturb that portion of the appellate order that required a new trial. Id. at 54, 477 A.2d at
1233.
Writing for the court, Justice Schreiber noted that the appellate division's decision was the product of the outmoded distinction between the common law writs of trespass and trespass on
the case. Id. at 46, 477 A.2d at 1228. Under the common law
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rule, proof of compensable injury was not required to sustain a
trespass action but was necessary to establish an action on the
case which, as the law developed, encompassed most intentional
torts, including legal fraud. Id. at 46-49, 477 A.2d at 1228-30.
Recognizing the unfairness of applying such a rule in cases involving willful and malicious conduct, the court determined that
it was inappropriate to require proof of actual damage where
some "loss, detriment or injury" has been suffered. Id. at 47-48,
477 A.2d at 1229. Consequently, nominal damages were deemed
recoverable where a cause of action for legal fraud has been established. Id. at 48, 477 A.2d at 1229-30.
The court also determined that a plaintiff's failure to prove
compensatory damages should not free the defendant of responsibility for aggravated misconduct. Observing that in actions for
legal fraud an intent to defraud rather than mere negligence is
required, the court reasoned that punitive damages serve as an
appropriate punishment and help to deter such conduct in the
future. Id. at 50, 477 A.2d at 1231. Moreover, the court determined that such damages are proper when compensatory damages are not computable, because nominal damages are
inadequate. Id. at 51, 477 A.2d at 1231. Thus, the court concluded that, if the elements of fraud are proven, a defrauded
plaintiff should be allowed to vindicate his rights regardless of
whether or not actual damages can be shown. Id. at 53, 477 A.2d
at 1233.
In a lengthy concurrence, Justice O'Hern called upon the
court to abandon its reliance on the "fiction" of nominal damages as a predicate to the award of punitive damages. Id. at 54,
477 A.2d at 1233 (O'Hern,J., concurring). In his view, the issue
before the court was whether punitive damages are appropriate
when commercial misrepresentation does not result in proven
economic loss. According to the concurrence, such damages
should be awarded if they serve the purposes for which they are
ordained. Id. at 60, 477 A.2d at 1237 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
In tracing the evolution of punitive damages, Justice O'Hern emphasized that tort law developed as an extension of criminal law.
He noted that such damages were designed to avoid extreme
forms of self-help, and he questioned their usefulness in the contemporary legal process. Id. at 55, 477 A.2d at 1234 (O'Hern,J.,
concurring). Consequently, in applying the "dimly perceived
purposes of punitive damages," he called for the development of
clear standards to guide courts and juries when considering puni-
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tive claims. Id. at 60-64, 477 A.2d at 1237-39 (O'Hern, J.,
concurring).
The court's decision in Nappe was based on those public policy objectives that favor the admonitory function of tort law. Its
modification of the common law to conform to modern notions
of equity and fairness was not unusual. The decision's effect,
however, may be the creation of an incentive for plaintiffs to
bring actions for petty cases arising out of personal affronts that
implicate no more than an individual's feelings of outrage. The
absence of the guidelines recommended by Justice O'Hern,
therefore, may result in undeserved windfalls to such plaintiffs.
In addition, as the number of punitive damage claims increases,
the New Jersey Supreme Court will be forced to address the related public policy question concerning the provision of liability
insurance to cover punitive damage awards. At present, the appellate division has determined that insuring against such awards
is contrary to public policy. Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Manu-

facturers Insurance Co., 72 N.J. Super. 10, 24-25, 410 A.2d 696,
703-04 (App. Div. 1980). It remains to be seen, however,
whether that policy will survive the evolution of the court's
"dimly perceived" conception of the function of punitive damages.
James F. Gizzi

CRIMINAL

LAW-ENTRAPMENT-NEW

MODIFIES ENTRAPMENT

JERSEY

DEFENSE-State v.

CRIMINAL

CODE

Rockholt, 96 N.J.

570, 476 A.2d 1236 (1984).
In January 1980, Donald Rockholt, an Atlantic City police
officer, sold a motorcyle owned by the police department to two
New Jersey State Police officers who were operating undercover.
96 N.J. at 573, 476 A.2d at 1237. During the following month,
Rockholt sold blank police identification cards to one of the
agents. Id. at 573-74, 476 A.2d at 1237. Finally, in July 1980, he
sold a controlled dangerous substance to the other undercover
officer. Id. at 574, 476 A.2d at 1237.
Rockholt was tried and convicted of misconduct in office, receiving stolen identification cards, and selling an illegal drug.
Id. at 573, 476 A.2d at 1237. At trial, he admitted committing the
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crimes but asserted that he had been entrapped by the undercover agents. Id. at 573-74, 476 A.2d at 1237. Rockholt claimed
that the agents were aware of his drug and alcohol dependence
and that they used his consequent need for money to induce him
to make the illegal sales. The jury rejected those claims. On appeal, Rockholt challenged the trial court's charge to the jury on
entrapment and asserted that it was unconstitutional to place the
burden of proving entrapment on the defendant. Id. at 574, 476
A.2d at 1238. The appellate division affirmed the convictions,
and the supreme court granted certification to review the trial
court's treatment of the entrapment defense. Id. at 573, 476
A.2d at 1237.
In affirming the decision of the appellate division, the
supreme court held that the trial court's "charge correctly conveyed the burden of proof and the essential elements of the entrapment defense under the [New Jersey] Code [of Criminal
Justice]." Id. at 583, 476 A.2d at 1243. The court also held that
it was not unconstitutional to require Rockholt to prove the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
In rendering its decision, the court reviewed the judicial development of the entrapment defense, as well as the modifications of that defense made by the New Jersey Code of Criminal
Justice. It noted that, historically, two separate entrapment defenses were recognized. The first, subjective entrapment, "existed when the criminal design originated with police officials and
was implanted in the mind of an innocent person." Id. at 575,
476 A.2d at 1238. The subjective entrapment defense thus distinguished between an innocent and a criminally inclined individual, and was unavailable to one who was predisposed to commit
the crime. Id. Once a defendant had introduced some evidence
of subjective entrapment, the state bore the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the police had not entrapped
him. Id. at 574-75, 476 A.2d at 1238. The second type of entrapment, objective entrapment, existed when the police conduct involved was so egregious that it would be unfair to allow the state
to take advantage of the fruits of that activity. The objective entrapment defense was available even to those who were predisposed to commit the crime with which they were charged. Id. at
575, 476 A.2d at 1238.
In contrast, the court found that entrapment under the
Criminal Code included both objective and subjective elements.
It observed that, in order to constitute entrapment under the

466

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:457

Code, the police conduct must not only " 'create a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than
those who are ready to commit it' " but also actually cause the
person entrapped to engage in criminal activity. Id. at 577, 476
A.2d at 1239 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West 1982)).
The court reasoned that the objective element of the defense, which depends upon proof that an average person would
not have been able to withstand the solicitations of the police,
was intended to deter police misconduct and was not at all dependent on the innocent character of the defendant. Id. at 57879, 476 A.2d at 1240. It found, however, that by requiring a defendant to prove that such solicitations "caused" his criminal
conduct, the Legislature had intended that a defendant's predisposition to crime be considered when the defense is raised. Id. at
578, 476 A.2d at 1240. Consequently, the court believed that
one who is predisposed to commit a particular crime will be unable to prove that police inducements were the "direct" cause of
his criminal activity. Id. at 579, 476 A.2d at 1240. Despite this
retention of the defense's subjective requirements, the court recognized that there still may be some instances in which the police
inducements are so egregious that they violate constitutional due
process requirements. Id. at 580-81, 476 A.2d at 1241. Upon
comparing the elements of the entrapment defense under the
Code to the trial court's jury charge, the court determined that
no error had been committed. Id. at 583-84, 476 A.2d at 1243.
An additional change wrought by the Code, the court observed, was the requirement that a defendant prove each element
of entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 577,
476 A.2d at 1232. Rockholt had asserted that placing the burden
of proof on the defendant was unconstitutional, in that the absence of entrapment was an element of a criminal offense, which
the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
581, 476 A.2d at 1292. In rejecting the defendant's argument,
the court observed that entrapment is characterized as the "commission of a criminal act pursuant to improper police solicitation." Id. at 582, 476 A.2d at 1242. The majority noted that
solicitation is not a defense when a private party induces the
criminal conduct and reasoned that solicitation to commit a
crime, whether made by the police or by a private party, does not
negate the mens rea necessary to establish the substantive elements of the crime. Thus, a defendant's nonpredisposition to
crime-essential to the establishment of an entrapment de-
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fense-was deemed irrelevant to determinations concerning his
mental culpability. Id. In the court's view, the entrapment defense is based upon the Legislature's policy of discouraging police misconduct. Because it is a "non-exculpatory public policy
defense that does not involve the critical mental element of the
crime," id. at 583, 476 A.2d at 1242, the state is not constitutionally required to prove its absence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id., 476 A.2d at 1242-43.
In his concurring opinion, Justice O'Hern stressed the objective element of the Code's entrapment defense. Id. at 584-87,
476 A.2d at 1243-45 (O'Hern, J., concurring). He asserted that
application of a uniform standard of police conduct in all cases in
which the defense is raised would greatly simplify the fact-finding
process. Id. at 586, 476 A.2d at 1244 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
More importantly, however, he believed that by eliminating extended inquiries into a defendant's criminal predisposition, the
Code defense prevents the introduction of a great deal of otherwise prejudicial character evidence. Id. at 586-87, 476 A.2d at
1244-45 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
It remains to be seen whether Justice O'Hern's optimistic
prediction will be borne out in practice. The majority opinion
comes dangerously close to endorsing a wholesale inquiry into a
defendant's criminal character. By intimating that a defendant
with a criminal predisposition will be unable to prove entrapment's causation element, the majority invites speculation concerning the "innocence" of the defendant's mind. Such an
inquiry necessarily implicates the defendant's character.
Although some character evidence may be necessary to evaluate
a particular defendant's response to police solicitations, it is
hoped that its use will be controlled in such a way that jurors will
not be tempted to evaluate a person's ultimate guilt or innocence
according to their conclusions concerning whether that person is
"good" or "bad." Justice O'Hern clearly has endorsed such controls. Hopefully, the trial courts will be guided by that opinion.
Sean M. Foxe
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JERSEY CONSTITUTION-GOV-

OF LINE-ITEM VETO

CONSTITUTIONAL-

Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 479 A.2d 403 (1984).
Governor Kean signed into law the Appropriations Act for
the fiscal year 1983 on June 30, 1982. 1982 N.J. Laws, ch.49.
Prior to the signing, however, Kean exercised his line-item veto
power to eliminate or reduce certain items of appropriation and
to delete several general conditions relating to other items.
Neither house of the Legislature attempted to override those vetoes. 97 N.J. at 487, 479 A.2d at 405.
Two of the Governor's vetoes were directed at appropriations designated by the Legislature for specific governmental
purposes. Id. at 493, 479 A.2d at 408. The first reduced by
$27,000 the amount of the proceeds from the franchise and gross
receipts taxes on public utilities that were to be distributed as
state aid to eligible municipalities. Id. at 494, 479 A.2d at 408.
The second veto eliminated funding for two highway projects
and reduced the appropriation for a third, without making a corresponding reduction in the Department of Transportation's
overall capital construction appropriation. Id. at 498, 479 A.2d
at 409. Kean also vetoed as unconstitutional several general provisions concerning the manner in which appropriated funds were
to be spent. Id. at 501-02, 479 A.2d at 413. One of those provisions would have abolished a number of vacant positions in the
state's executive agencies, and another would have dictated the
order in which civil servants were to be laid off in the event that a
state agency ran out of funds. Id. at 503-04, 479 A.2d at 414.
The last of the vetoed provisions was attached to the Department
of Corrections appropriation and would have prohibited the construction of a new correctional facility in Hunterdon County. Id.
at 510, 479 A.2d at 417.
Although no attempt was made to override the vetoes, the
Speaker of the General Assembly and the President of the Senate
filed a notice of appeal in the appellate division, challenging the
Governor's exercise of his line-item veto power. Id. at 487, 479
A.2d at 405. The appellate division upheld all but one of the
executive vetoes. Id. at 488, 479 A.2d at 405. In overturning the
Governor's decision to eliminate and reduce specific state highway projects, the appellate court held that the failure to make a
corresponding reduction in the overall appropriation for the Department of Transportation constituted an unauthorized "affirm-

1985]

S URVE Y

469

ative" use of the veto power. Id. at 499, 479 A.2d at 411. The
legislators appealed to the state supreme court, and the Governor filed a cross appeal. Id. at 488, 479 A.2d at 405.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Id. at 512, 479 A.2d at 418. In doing so, it held
that the line-item veto power may be used to excise, in whole or
in part, any portion of an appropriations bill that "constitutes an
appropriation or an item of appropriation or is in any way related
to appropriations or the expenditure of appropriated sums." Id.
at 511, 479 A.2d at 418. Concluding that each of the affected
provisions fell within this general category, the court upheld all
of the challenged vetoes. Id. at 512, 479 A.2d at 418.
The New Jersey Constitution empowers the governor to veto
"in whole or in part" any expenditure in an appropriations bill.
NJ. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 15; see 97 N.J. at 489, 479 A.2d at
405-06. The Karcher court found that "[a]n appropriation is an
authorization, statutorily enacted by the Legislature, for the withdrawal of monies from the State treasury for governmental purposes." 97 N.J. at 491, 479 A.2d at 407. In the court's view, the
Governor's reduction of the amount of the franchise and gross
receipts taxes appropriated as state aid to municipalities constituted a proper objection to the Legislature's authorization to
spend state funds for that purpose. Id. at 495, 479 A.2d at 409.
His elimination of funding for specific highway projects was
viewed similarly. Id. at 499, 479 A.2d at 411-12. Moreover, in
rejecting the appellate division's conclusion that the elimination
of funding for specific projects without corresponding reductions
in the amount appropriated to the Department of Transportation
constituted an unauthorized use of the veto power, the court determined that the power extends to " '[a]ny single line account
for which an appropriation is provided in an Appropriations
Act.' " Id., 479 A.2d at 412 (quoting Budget Message of Governor
Kean, glossary 22b (March 15, 1982)). The court concluded that
this power preserves the system of checks and balances which, it
claimed, is essential to the budget-making process. Id. at 500,
479 A.2d at 412.
In addition to spending authorizations, the court noted that
appropriations bills typically include "provisions that establish
conditions, restrictions, or limitations on the expenditure, use, or
application of appropriated funds." Id. at 491-92, 479 A.2d at
407. It reasoned that, although such provisions do not eliminate
or reduce any specific item of appropriation, the language of the
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state constitution's veto clause should be read as including them
as a part of the appropriation of those funds. Id. at 509, 479 A.2d
at 416. The veto power, therefore, extends to any portion of the
Appropriations Act that is related to the state's fiscal affairs. Id.
at 508, 479 A.2d at 415-16. Consequently, those conditions relating to the elimination of positions in the executive branch and
those relating to the manner in which state employees were to be
laid off were considered fiscal matters and thus subject to the
Governor's veto regardless of whether or not they could be characterized as unconstitutional intrusions by the Legislature into
the executive domain. See id. at 510, 479 A.2d at 417. The court
also determined that the Governor's deletion of the condition accompanying the appropriation of funds for new prisons was sufficiently related to fiscal matters to withstand the Legislature's
challenge. Id. at 511, 479 A.2d at 418.
The decision of the Karcher court is basically sound. By petitioning the court to overrule the Governor's line-item veto of
certain appropriations, the Legislature's leaders were asking the
court to act as a super-legislature. Their appeal, however, should
have been to the members of the Legislature, who have the constitutional authority to override an executive veto. To require
otherwise would violate the basic consitutional requirement of
separation of powers among the branches of government.
James V. Hetzel

CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT TO

SupP. 1984-1985)
OF

UNITED

LAW-ENFORCEMENT
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JUDGMENTS-

ANN. § 2A:17-17 (WEST CUM.
VIOLATES FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE

NJ. STAT.

STATES

CONSTITUTION--City

of Philadelphia v.

Bauer, 97 N.J. 372, 478 A.2d 773 (1984).
Ralph E. Bauer, a New Jersey resident, was employed by the
Federal government in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. From 1972
through 1974, he failed to pay the city wage tax provided for in a
Philadelphia tax ordinance. The city instituted an action in Pennsylvania to recover the unpaid taxes, which culminated in the entry of a judgment against Bauer in the amount of $3017.26.

Philadelphia then initiated an action on its Pennsylvania
judgment in the Camden County District Court. The district
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court entered a judgment in favor of the city, which was subsequently docketed in the New Jersey Superior Court. After the
city's unsuccessful attempts to attach Bauer's personal property,
it requested the Sheriff of Camden County to schedule a sale of
the defendant's real property. 97 N.J. at 375, 478 A.2d at 775.
Bauer, however, filed a complaint to enjoin execution on the
judgment pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-17 (West Cum.
Supp. 1984-1985), which prohibits the enforcement of any employment wage tax by levying on the taxpayer's real property.
The trial court issued a permanent injunction, which was upheld
by the appellate division. The supreme court granted Philadelphia's appeal as of right and reversed the lower court's order. 97
N.J. at 376, 478 A.2d at 775.
The supreme court held that to the extent the statutory exemption denied enforcement of a sister state's judgments, it was
in clear violation of the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 379, 478 A.2d at 777; cf. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1. Applying the doctrine of merger, the court determined that a state must accord full faith and credit to a sister
state's judgment even if the cause of action underlying that judgment would be invalid in the forum state. 97 N.J. at 377, 478
A.2d at 776. Thus, once a foreign judgment has been entered in
a sister state, it merges into the judgment of that state, and its
original identity is lost. Id. at 377-78, 478 A.2d at 776. In the
majority's view, therefore, the judgment that the city of Philadelphia sought to enforce in New Jersey was based on a simple
money judgment obtained in the district court rather than on a
cause of action for enforcement of the city's wage tax. Id. at 378,
478 A.2d at 776. Consequently, the court deemed N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:17-17 inapplicable to Philadelphia's attempts to enforce its judgment against Bauer. That statute required a New
Jersey court to look beyond its own judgment to the cause of action underlying the sister state's judgment. The court, however,
found that the requirements of the full faith and credit clause
were implicated. 97 N.J. at 379, 478 A.2d at 777. Although it
recognized that an enforcing state may constitutionally determine the "scope and nature" of the remedies available to judgment creditors, the court reasoned that a state may not unduly
restrict the means of enforcing foreign judgments. Id. at 381,
478 A.2d at 778. After reviewing the methods of enforcement
available to the city of Philadelphia under New Jersey law, the
majority concluded that the statute denied the city the only effec-
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tive means of enforcing its judgment and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Id. at 382-84, 478 A.2d at 778-79.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Schreiber asserted that the
statute did not deny recognition of judgments arising out of actions to collect wage taxes. He reasoned that the enactment
merely foreclosed one method of enforcement and opined that
remedies other than the sale of realty could be used to enforce
such judgments. Id. at 389, 478 A.2d at 782 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). He noted the availability of levy and execution on personal property such as bank accounts, securities, and motor
vehicles, and he pointed out that once docketed in New Jersey, a
judgment constitutes a lien on the debtor's realty. Id. at 389-90,
478 A.2d at 783 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice
Schreiber asserted that although, as a Federal employee, Bauer's
wages were not subject to garnishment, he nevertheless could be
required to make periodic payments in order to satisfy the judgment. Id. at 390, 478 A.2d at 783 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
The dissent correctly observed that remedies other than the
forced sale of real property are available to satisfy wage tax judgments. Although the majority acknowledged that a state that accords full faith and credit to a sister state's judgments may define
the scope and nature of the means of enforcement, it believed
that the Legislature had placed undue burdens on the city of
Philadelphia's efforts to enforce its judgment. It is unclear
whether the majority would find acceptable a statute requiring a
judgment creditor to exhaust his other remedies before seeking
satisfaction through the forced sale of realty. Such a statute
probably would result in the satisfaction of most wage tax judgments, while also providing some protection to judgment debtors, who might otherwise lose their homes.
Joanne M. Maxwell

ESTABLISHED CRIEVIDENCE-DEATH-BY-AUTO-JUDICIALLY
TERIA FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF BLOOD-ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS
PROTECTED

BY

STATUTORY

PATIENT-PHYSICIAN

PRIVILEGE-

State v. Dyal, 97 NJ. 229, 478 A.2d 390 (1984).
On April 6, 1979, Peter Dyal was involved in a one-vehicle
accident in which his passenger, Jan Kane, was seriously injured.
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97 N.J. at 232, 478 A.2d at 392. At the time of the accident, the
investigating police officer had no suspicion that Dyal had been
driving while under the influence of alcohol. Dyal was not arrested, and the police did not request that he submit to a blood
test. Because he had sustained a facial laceration, however, Dyal
permitted hospital personnel to perform a blood test. Id. at 233,
478 A.2d at 392.
Jan Kane died two days after the accident. Following her
death, two of her former co-workers gave voluntary statements to
the police concerning Dyal's alcohol consumption prior to the
accident. Although no charges were pending against Dyal, the
investigating officer secured a subpoena for the blood test results. Subsequently, the hospital's serum alcohol reading was
translated to a 0.12% blood-alcohol content. Id. at 234, 478
A.2d at 393. As a result, Dyal was charged with driving while
under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 234-35, 478 A.2d at 393.
Eventually, he was indicted for causing death-by-auto.
Dyal's pretrial motion to suppress the blood test results was
denied. The test results were admitted at trial, and Dyal was convicted of causing death-by-auto. In reversing, the appellate division held that the test results were protected by the patientphysician privilege set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2
(West 1976) and, therefore, were inadmissible. 97 N.J. at 235,
478 A.2d at 393. The supreme court granted certification to determine whether the statutory privilege required suppression of
the hospital's test results. Id. at 232, 478 A.2d at 391.
The supreme court reversed the appellate division's order
and held that blood test results that are protected by the patientphysician privilege can be acquired by police if a subpoena duces
tecum is first obtained from a municipal court judge. The court
further held that the subpoena should issue only upon a judicial
determination that the police have a "reasonable basis to believe
the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence." Id. In addition, the court determined that the issuing
judge, in evaluating the reasonableness of the belief, may consider the objective facts known by the police at the time of the
accident or at some reasonable time thereafter. Id.
Justice Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, did not question the Legislature's authority to adopt the patient-physician
privilege. He noted, however, that historically courts have opposed such a rule and that recently there have been legislative
attempts to abrogate the privilege in drunken driving and death-
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by-auto prosecutions. Id. at 235-37, 478 A.2d at 393-94. Moreover, the court acknowledged the importance of New Jersey's
policy of removing drunken drivers from the roadways. That
policy, the court reasoned, must be balanced against the statutory privilege. Id. at 237, 478 A.2d at 394.
In examining the competing interests, the court noted the
purpose of the patient-physician privilege. It observed that the
privilege facilitates proper medical care by safeguarding a patient's communications with his physician. Absent the privilege,
the court reasoned, the threat of criminal prosecution might
cause an individual to jeopardize his own health by refusing to
submit to necessary treatment. Justice Pollock also acknowledged that the privilege protects the rights of a driver, like Dyal,
who was not suspected of driving while under the influence at the
time the blood sample was drawn. Id. at 238, 478 A.2d at 394.
The court further observed, however, that the privilege results in
non-disclosure at trial of evidence of "the most reliable and probative kind," id. at 237, 478 A.2d at 394, and therefore concluded
that "a sensible accommodation of the privilege and the interests
ofjustice was required." Id. at 240-41, 478 A.2d at 396.
In balancing the privilege and the interests ofjustice, Justice
Pollock analogized the usual emergent atmosphere surrounding
automobile accidents to the exigent circumstances justifying warrantless searches and seizures. Id. at 239, 478 A.2d at 395. He
also considered the "evanescent" nature of evidence of intoxication, given the body's ability to dissipate alcohol rapidly. Id. at
239-40, 478 A.2d at 395. In addition, the court resolved that the
public's interest in the prompt securing of an accident scene
should not preclude police access to significant evidence of
intoxication.
After reasoning that a patient's privacy interest in privileged
blood test results could be sufficiently safeguarded without establishing an absolute prohibition against their use in court, Justice
Pollock concluded that, under some circumstances, a subpoena
could issue to override the privilege. Id. at 240, 478 A.2d at 396.
Such a subpoena, the court determined, could issue if the police
established, at a hearing procedurally and substantively similar to
that necessary to secure the issuance of a search warrant, that a
reasonable basis for believing that the individual was driving
while under the influence. Id. at 240-41, 478 A.2d at 396.
In establishing criteria for the admissibility of privileged
blood test results, the Dyal court responded to the fervor of the
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Legislature's recent attempts to rid the roads of drunken drivers.
It apparently determined that the climate in the Legislature was
such that judicial abrogation of the statutory privilege in deathby-auto cases would not draw an angry response from its authors.
Whether the privilege will be disallowed in the less serious offense of driving while under the influence, however, remains to

be seen.
While paying lip-service to the purposes underlying the privilege, the court accomplished in one fell swoop that which the
Legislature has twice failed to do. The lack of resistance in this
instance does not lessen the inherent danger of a judiciary that
"legislates" in contravention of statutorily protected privacy interests.
Catherine A. Kiernan

